2. Background paper to accompany the above policy

Europe Policy Background

This paper provides background to the redrafted Europe policy chapter. 

Much of the existing Europe Chapter in PSS dates from the early days of the EEC/European Union, before it expanded to include a wide swathe of European countries, before there was proportional representation for elections to the European Parliament, and before we had any Green Party representation in it. At that time Green representation and a green agenda seemed far from the priorities of a bloc focused on neoliberal economic policies, and few countries in Europe had strong Green parties engaged in politics at the European level. The opening statements of that GPEW policy chapter expressed what doubtless seemed when they were written to be legitimate concerns about the incompatibility of our Green Party goals and visions with the agenda of the European institutions, as it was then.

By contrast, the position is now very much reversed: we have become one of the key pro-European parties in the UK, as we have seen the EU transform itself into an institution that has led the way on workers’ rights, international human rights, environmental policies and the use of soft power such as conditions on trade deals that can effect positive change in other parts of the world too. The Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament was at its strongest when we sent 11 representatives from the UK, and it lost some of its power when we left. While there are still aspects of the EU that all European Green Parties find problematic, a key part of being a Green Party is that we favour international collaboration to deliver rights and protections across borders and not just in our own local patch. The revised chapter aims to reframe the policy in terms suitable for a pro-European Green Party in the post Brexit period. 

We have taken the view that, while the UK is outside the EU and potentially seeking membership, we have no credible position of superiority from which we can instruct the European Union about what it should or should not become, although we can express our desire that it should maintain a trajectory towards prioritising social, racial and environmental justice over economic interests, and that it is on this basis that we are in favour of being part of these institutions.

The Autumn Conference in 2022 passed a Policy Statement on Closer Alignment to the European Union. The Conference the following Spring (2023) passed new text to replace parts of the previous policy Chapter. A new section on the UK’s relationship with the European Union was based on the Policy Statement passed in autumn 2022. The Autumn Conference in 2023 passed a new section on the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights. Following discussion with the Policy Development Committee, some of this material has been shortened or removed from the final draft version of the chapter. There has been some reordering to maintain the logic of the completed chapter. 

The Motion proposing the chapter also includes a series of amendments to other chapters of the Policies for a Sustainable Society. These reflect the fact that the UK is currently no longer a member state of the European Union. They are not intended to change the substance of Green Party policy in the areas concerned. 

Overview of the revised chapter

Part 1 expresses the principles on which our policy is based. It replaces a longer section entitled “The Green Vision for Europe” that was approved by Conference in Spring 2023.

Parts 2 to 4 express our ambition to re-join the EU and to make short term steps towards doing so. Part 2 sets out the policy of re-joining with some of the reasons, and options for closer alignment while we are not yet a member; Part 3 addresses some of the criticisms around democratic legitimacy. Part 4 considers four pillars of EU membership, including the Euro and Schengen.

Parts 5 and 6 set out the importance of continued co-operation with the EU in a number of policy areas. 

Parts 7 and 8 deal with Europe and the wider world, including trade, defence and migration.

Part 9 considers Human Rights and the Council of Europe, and Part 10 sketches plans for how the Green Party would move towards securing democratic assent for a policy of re-joining the EU and enabling UK citizens to feel European. 

The paragraphs below provide background on individual parts of the revised chapter.

Part 1: Principles

This section replaces a section entitled “The Green Vision for Europe” that was approved by Conference in Spring 2023. PDC have advised that there is a need to shorten the Chapter and to remove language that is declaratory or explanatory rather than strictly policy-focussed. 

The section that has been removed read as follows:

EU100: The Green Party of England and Wales is part of an international family of global Greens, and a longstanding member of the European Green Party. Along with our sister parties in Europe, we favour international collaboration, especially with our neighbours on our own continent. We honour and respect the founding principles of the post-war European institutions that have ensured long-lasting peace, dialogue and unity of purpose across the nations of Europe, and we believe that participation in those institutions is one essential means of furthering the Green agenda at home and abroad. 

EU101: We believe that issues of social justice, peace, human rights, equality, environmental justice and responsibility do not stop at the UK border. Consequently, protection for our shared planet, land, sea and air, requires legislation at global and regional levels, for which collaborative democratic institutions such as the EU are crucial. We subscribe to ideals of human rights, workers’ rights, democracy, freedom of movement across borders, redistribution of wealth and privilege between nations both within Europe and globally, —the ideals that are the motivating goals of the European Union, the Council of Europe and other European institutions dedicated to overseeing particular areas of collaboration and regulation. We are committed to retaining or recovering UK membership and positions of influence for our own democratically elected representatives in these bodies. We aim to promote knowledge and understanding of the importance of these institutions in delivering our Green goals, and in ensuring peace and justice across Europe and the rest of the world. 

EU102: We celebrate the way that Greens working in the European Union institutions have strengthened regulation to protect Europe’s people and environment. We believe that the ecological challenges and stark inequalities the world faces present a potential new role for the EU as part of wider global co-operation. We continue to support trade regulated to achieve social and ecological protection, based on local resilience, respect for human rights, and genuine sustainability. We encourage further efforts to rein in the excessive power of vested political and economic interests and multinational corporations and especially of the fossil fuel lobby. As Greens we are also committed to taking account of historic and post-colonial responsibilities. 

Structures 

EU110: Membership of the European Union gave the Green Party of England and Wales access to elected roles in democratic institutions at a high level of international influence, and a direct role in formulating legislation and regulations that contributed to progressing Green goals and ambitions across many areas of life in the UK and in neighbouring countries. While the institutions of the EU are not perfect, we recognise that in many respects the European Parliament has a more democratic structure than the Westminster Parliament, and has a positive commitment to seeking consensus. We would favour further progress towards strengthening the democratic accountability of the main EU bodies, and towards extending the scope of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union. We favour the introduction of transnational lists, and the right of legislative initiative for the European Parliament. 

EU111: We believe that issues should, as far as possible, be decided at the local level, where they are local, and at national or international level where appropriate. This principle of subsidiarity is a founding principle of EU policy-making. In an increasingly global and over-exploited world, many issues of social and racial justice, employment, migration, and environmental degradation must be settled at a European level or global level. Issues of defence and peace-keeping also require Europe-wide decision making. It is vital that we contribute to ensuring that there are effective, democratic, representative, and powerful bodies that can legislate in these areas. 

The new section (EU100-EU103) draws on the Green Party’s Philosophical Basis to explain why we are committed to renewed UK membership of the European Union and to close co-operation with the EU while we are outside it. 

Part 2: The UK’s relationship with the European Union 

Spring Conference 2023 passed a new section with wording as follows:

EU900: The Green Party regrets that the UK is no longer a member of the European Union. We continue to believe that the UK would be in a better position politically, socially, environmentally and economically if we had maintained our EU membership. We recognise that a united international response to global issues is even more needed in the contemporary world. 

EU901: The Green Party maintains that full membership of the EU remains the best option for the UK, and we are in favour of pursuing a policy to re-join as soon as the political situation is favourable and the right terms are available.

EU902: We deplore the UK government’s failure to prepare properly for the massive changes to our economic and social structures caused by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, putting businesses at risk and damaging citizens’ opportunities. We also regret the decision not to undertake any official monitoring of the economic impacts of leaving the EU. 

EU903: We believe that many of the worst problems resulting from Brexit would be eased by re-joining the customs union and signing up to a comprehensive agreement with the EU covering the protection of human, animal and plant life. We would also support a speedy return to free movement of people between the UK and the European Union, and continued inclusion in the Horizon Europe Research programme. 

EU904: While we continue to support the principle of subsidiarity, local supply chains, and strengthened local economies, the Green Party believes that the UK should mirror or improve on the legislative rules governing the EU single market and its standards on workers’ rights, health and safety, and environmental protection. 

EU905: In particular, we deeply regret the loss of rights and opportunities afforded to our young people and will campaign to ensure that all young people regardless of background and socio-economic status, continue to enjoy the opportunity to explore the continent they share with those from the EU member states, particularly through continued participation in the Erasmus+ scheme. 

EU906: The Green Party of England and Wales deplores the use of the UK Internal Market Act to limit the rights of the devolved nations to retain their alignment with the EU, and to go further and faster with environmental protection measures. We are deeply concerned that peace in Northern Ireland is threatened as a result of the UK government’s attempts to undo the Northern Ireland protocol.

EU907: For as long as the UK remains outside the EU we support close political co-operation with the EU, and in particular working with the EU in addressing the twin crises of climate breakdown and biodiversity loss. We encourage close co-operation with the EU in support of European and global peace and security. 

EU908: We commit to maintaining or rebuilding close and friendly relationships with our European neighbours through groups such as pro-European organisations, professional associations and twinning schemes. 

EU909: The EU referendum campaign exposed severe inadequacies in our democratic safeguards, and uncovered deep divisions in our society. It highlighted the growing inequality in our country and widespread unhappiness about the way that the country was being run. We reject the idea that these problems were due to the UK’s membership of the EU and reaffirm our commitment to policies that are designed to share wealth and opportunities more equally and fairly. The Green Party will work with others to heal our divided communities because genuine democracy requires a shared vision of the future we can build together. 

Following discussion with Policy Development Committee, paras EU902-EU903 and EU 905-EU906 have been removed from the text. The policy points they made are now covered elsewhere in the text. The remaining paragraphs are now in Part 2 and Part 10 of the revised policy draft.

The revised text summarises the reasons why re-joining the EU is supported by the Green Party and sets out guidelines for the UK’s relationship with Europe while we are outside the EU. These are based on a default assumption of the closest possible co-operation, and dynamic alignment with developing EU standards.

Part 3: A Positive View of the UK’s Place in Europe

This section responds to the perceived lack of democratic legitimacy and accountability of the European Union. This was a key part of the discourse around Brexit and is therefore something to which the Green Party, as a proponent of re-joining the EU, needs to have a convincing response.  

The EU currently has 27 Member States (MS), and the UK was a MS from 1973 until 31 January 2020. The MS take an active role in managing the development of the EU’s policies and are represented in the EU’s major institutions:

• The European Parliament consists of elected representatives from each MS. Its role and influence in policy setting has grown over the years, though there is scope for further growth.
• The Council of the EU (also known as the “Council” or “Council of Ministers”, and not to be  confused with the Council of Europe, which is a separate human rights group, not part of the EU – see separate heading) is effectively the EU’s executive. It negotiates and adopts EU laws, together with the European Parliament, based on proposals from the European Commission. The Council consists of relevant ministers of all Member States’ ministries. It works within the general policy direction and priorities set by the European Council, which is a quarterly meeting of the heads of state or heads of government of the MS.
• The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has two parts (“Courts”). One, the “Court of Justice”; (sometimes called European Court of Justice, ECJ), provides “preliminary findings” on questions of European law and its application; it has a judge from each MS. The second, the “General Court”, deals mainly with actions against the EU or its institutions; it has two judges from each MS. (Note: The CJEU is distinct from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which is associated with the Council of Europe (see Part [8] below), not the European Union).
• The European Commission (EC) proposes new EU laws and manages the implementation of most of the EU’s policies. It also administers the budget, collects statistics (Eurostat) and monitors that MS apply EU law correctly. In many ways it is similar to the civil service, but it does have the right of initiative to put forward new laws. The Commission’s political leadership is the “College of Commissioners” with one member from each MS. The EC is staffed by a mixture of delegates from the MS’ civil services and by direct employees drawn from across the MS.
• The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) is the voice of regions and cities in the European Union (EU). It represents local and regional authorities across the European Union and advises on new laws that have an impact on regions and cities (70% of all EU legislation). It has 329 members representing local and regional authorities from all 27 EU Member States.
• The European Central Bank manages the monetary policy around the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the Euro.
• The European Investment Bank (EIB – not be confused with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD, or the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)) is owned by the EU Member States. It invests through loans, equity shares and guarantees in projects that support the EU’s aims and objectives, mainly in Europe.
• The European Court of Auditors makes sure EU funds are correctly accounted for, and all funds are raised and spent in line with EU financial rules. It has one member from each MS.

Concerns about democratic legitimacy have generally focussed on the perceived dominant role of the Commission in proposing legislation. Whereas MEPs are directly elected and the Council consists of members of member states’ democratically elected governments, the commissioners are not elected, but appointed by member states’ governments.   The President of the Commission is chosen by agreement between Member States. However the appointment of Commissioners and the President is subject to ratification by the Parliament. 

That perceived gap feeds into the argument that as a Member State the UK was subject to decisions imposed on it by “unelected bureaucrats” in the EU. To a great extent these concerns were exaggerated. The UK as a Member State played an active and central part in the development of policy and legislation, and had negotiated opt-outs on a number of issues where its approach was at odds with that of other Member States. 

These arguments also ignore the central fact that the nature and raison d’etre of the EU requires the sharing of aspects of sovereignty, in the interests of the UK and in the interests of a stronger, more effective Europe. That in turn implies compromise: while others play a part in shaping decisions that affect us, we also have a role in shaping decisions that affect them. This is an approach based on cooperation to the benefit of all, rather than a competitive, zero-sum approach to relations between countries. 

Nevertheless there is room for improvement, in particular in ensuring that the Parliament – as the only directly elected one of the three central decision-making bodies – is able effectively to carry out its role in scrutiny and to strengthen its role as an originator of legislation. 

Past British Governments (and other Member States Governments) have tended to be disingenuous in communicating about the role of the EU, using it as a scapegoat for unpopular decisions and taking credit themselves for positive actions by the EU. Honest communication is essential to build public understanding of the EU, its benefits and its shortcomings.

Part 4: Customs Union, the Euro and Schengen

Customs Union

Factual background

A customs union is a kind of free trade area. The members of the customs union agree to abolish customs duties and tariffs on trade between members of the customs union, and to set up a common system of tariffs and import quotas on goods from outside the customs union. Customs duties are harmonised, so that duties and tariffs on goods coming into the customs union from outside are the same, regardless of through which member state they enter the customs union. Checks on goods entering the customs union area are carried out as goods enter the area.

The EU Customs Union is such a union and is therefore an important part of the ‘free movement of goods’ aspect of the Single Market.

The EU Customs Union includes all 27 EU member states. Monaco is in a customs union with France, through which it has access to the EU Customs Union. There are separate customs unions between the EU and each of Turkey, San Marino and Andorra.

Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland have special arrangements for access to the Single Market but are not in a customs union with the EU. Northern Ireland, too, is not part of a customs union with the EU, but it does have similar arrangements under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

Policy considerations

 The main benefit of a customs union is that most goods moving within the customs union area are free of border controls and checks. This significantly reduces the cost, time and paperwork needed to move goods between countries within the customs union.

The re-introduction of the customs border when the UK left the EU (and therefore left the EU Customs Union) demonstrates the added difficulties. Lack of facilities and personnel to operate customs procedures at the UK’s borders and the need to define and implement the required bureaucratic customs processes led to repeated delays and concerns over the resulting extra costs. It is estimated that the UK’s non-participation in the EU Customs Union will cost traders anything from 4 to 15% of the cost of goods sold, as well as increasing the time needed to bring goods to market (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/72/7207.htm#:~:text=141%20A%20report%20commissioned%20by,the%20cost%20of%20goods%20sold).

The land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would also be more manageable if the UK and Republic of Ireland were in a customs union, as they were before the UK left the EU and the EU Customs Union. To avoid border checks on the island of Ireland, new checks and new rules in respect of goods moving between Britain and Northern Ireland were introduced – a move which has proven to be hugely controversial and which remains a potential source of political instability. If the UK were to join the EU Customs Union this problem would be eliminated.

However, a customs union does mean that a member cannot have independent trade agreements with third parties or make their own trade deals. Instead, the European Commission negotiates international trade deals for and on behalf of all members of the customs union as a whole. Of course, the EU is a much larger market than Britain by itself, and the EU is likely to be able to strike better trade deals than Britain acting independently.

Single Market

Factual background

The Single Market aims to allow free movement of people, goods, services and capital amongst its members. That means that:

• People have the right to move, live and work in different member states of the Single Market, provided that they have a job or other source of income.
• Goods can be transported between member states without tariff, quota or non-tariff barriers (such as different approval requirements). 
• Services may be offered and provided by people or businesses located in one member state to clients in a different member state on the same basis as services offered or provided by people or businesses in that other state. (Some practical obstacles still need to be resolved, for example on administrative procedures or the mutual recognition of professional qualifications.)
• Capital should be allowed to be moved between member states without restrictions. Some exceptions are allowed, for example, measures to prevent infringement of national laws on taxation, measures to collect information on capital movements for administrative or statistical purposes and measures justified on the grounds of public security.

The Single Market comprises the 27 EU Member States, as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Switzerland participates in the Single Market via a number of sector-specific treaties. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have limited access to the Single Market in selected sectors.

Northern Ireland is required to maintain alignment with Single Market rules applying to goods, in order to avoid the need to introduce a goods border on the island of Ireland.

Policy considerations

The Single Market with its “four freedoms” obviously has many benefits for individuals and for the UK economy as a whole. It allows people to live and work in a different Single Market member state, if they wish, and it reduces the costs for businesses wanting to sell goods or services in another SM member state – which in turn helps keep down the cost of such goods and services in the UK.

Removal of barriers between states necessitates a high level of harmonisation of rules and standards, which participating states are obliged to follow. Standards have tended to be at a relatively high level of safety and consumer protection, to the benefit of all consumers.

On the other hand, freedom of movement of people obviously means that it is harder to manage immigration by citizens of SM member states into the UK. While that may sound alarm bells, it should be remembered that immigration has been relatively stable over the years before Covid: a reduction in immigration from the EU to the UK since the Brexit referendum seems to have been compensated by an increase in immigration by non-EU citizens (see https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingjune2023 ). As is well known, since Brexit took effect, there has been a large increase in immigration to the UK.

Another important consideration is that many of the rules and standards of the Single Market are set within the European Union. While it was still in the EU, the UK had a significant role in shaping the Single Market and on leaving the EU was of course aligned with it. Unless we also re-join the EU, the UK would have little influence on the ongoing evolution of the Single Market.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the Single Currency

Factual background

The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) represents a major step in the integration of EU economies. Launched in 1992, EMU involves the coordination of economic and fiscal policies, a common monetary policy and a common currency, the euro. The euro was introduced as an accounting currency in 1999, with physical coins and notes being introduced in 2002.

The European Central Bank (ECB) manages the monetary policy relating to the common currency. The ECB Governing Council is the main decision-making body of the ECB; it consists of the governors of the national central banks of the euro area countries, plus the six members of the ECB Executive Board.

Initially only 11 EU Member States joined the euro, but by 2024, 20 of the EU’s 27 MS had the euro as their currency. A commitment to join the EMU and the euro once they fulfil the convergence criteria (see below) is likely to be a requirement for any candidate country wishing to join the EU. The status of the 7 EU member states that have not joined the euro is:

• Denmark (joined EU in 1973) has an opt-out. However, it has kept a stable exchange rate of the Danish krone against the euro.
• Sweden (joined EU in 1995) has not yet adopted the euro, but should do so once it meets the necessary conditions.
• Czechia, Hungary and Poland (all joined EU in 2004) are currently preparing to adopt the euro.
• Bulgaria and Romania (both joined EU in 2007) are committed to adopt the euro once they fulfil the necessary conditions (Bulgaria is in ERM II  – see below).

The process of adopting the euro involves ‘convergence criteria’ in four main areas:

• Price stability: Average inflation rate not more than 1.5 percentage points above the rate of the three best performing Member States.
• Sound and sustainable public finances: Government deficit and debt are consistent with the Stability and Growth Pact (see below).
• Exchange rate stability (against the euro): Participation in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) for at least 2 years without severe tensions, in particular without devaluing against the euro. ERM II allows currencies to fluctuate 15% above or below an agreed euro exchange rate; to stay within the band, it may be necessary to buy or sell currency.
• Durability of convergence: Long term interest rates should be no more than 2 percentage points above the rate of the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability.

As the examples of Sweden, Czechia, Hungary and Poland show, there can be several decades between joining the EU and joining the euro.

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) mentioned above was agreed in 1997 to ensure the stability of the EMU and of the euro. It aims to ensure that all EU member states – and particularly members of the euro area – have sound public finances, with member state deficits of less than 3% of GDP and public debt of less than 60% of GDP.  Above those figures, SGP looks for a credible plan to reduce deficits and debts to these limits, and a so-called “excessive deficit procedure” can be used to create such a plan (the initiation of most sanctions under this procedure can be blocked by a qualified majority of member state governments in the Council of the European Union).

The SGP contains a general escape clause, which permits the usual budgetary criteria to be relaxed in exceptional situations. This clause was activated at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and was extended during 2022 as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The pact has been reformed several times. The current (2024) reform is intended to encourage member states to implement the measures needed to secure the green transitions (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/eN/ip_24_711 ), however, the scope for such measures only appear to be minor.

The banking union was created in 2014, following the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. It improves regulation and supervision of the EU financial sector, particularly in the euro area, in order to make Europe’s banks more robust and allow businesses, investors and citizens to be more confident in the European financial system.

All euro area member states must participate in the banking union and follow the ‘Single Rulebook’, while non-euro area EU member states can choose to do so.  Denmark and Sweden have also considered joining.

The banking union is currently comprised of two pillars:

• The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which involves direct supervision of “significant institutions” by the European Central Bank (ECB); and
• The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which is responsible for the resolution of failing significant institutions.

For banks operating across the EU, it is seen as an attractive prospect to be under (single) ECB supervision.  For example, Nordic bank Nordea moved its headquarters location from Sweden to Finland in 2018 in order to be inside the banking union.

Policy considerations

Joining the euro may raise issues relating to wider Green Party policy on two grounds (assuming things remain as they are now):  first, convergence criteria emphasise GDP as a measure of the state of an economy, whereas we would want to include other measures such as wellbeing of the people, sustainability and environmental wellbeing.  Second, the convergence criteria and the SGP as they currently stand may not allow sufficient flexibility on funding due to the ‘balanced budget’ approach, whereas taking an approach that places less emphasis on the size of the government deficit would allow more scope for funding a Green transition in the UK (as well as in the whole of Europe).

On the other hand, the timescales involved in joining the euro are decades (see the experience of Sweden, Czechia, Hungary and Poland discussed above). That gives a lot of time to make major progress with the UK Green transition – indeed, it may well be largely completed by the time the euro question becomes relevant.   Moreover, if we are working in the EU together with the other Green Parties within the EU, we can help reform the SGP onto a basis that does not rely on GDP and ‘balanced budget’.  

Finally, many issues that concern the Green Party cannot be solved at the level of an individual state. Instead, close international co-operation is essential to address, for example, climate change, decarbonising energy, agriculture and transport, biodiversity and so on (see also EU210).  From within the EU we have a chance to leverage the Green transition across the whole of Europe, rather than limiting it to the UK.   We therefore propose to keep options open about re-joining the EU rather than formulating red lines about the euro, especially considering the long timescales involved.     

Schengen Agreement

Factual background

The Schengen area (“Schengen”) was created to eliminate internal border controls between participating European countries. It is named after the small village in Luxembourg where the Schengen Agreement and the Schengen Convention upon which it is based were signed in 1985 and 1990 respectively.

Within the Schengen area, people can generally cross land, sea and air borders without any border checks whatsoever – a little like the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland/UK. Obviously, Schengen requires, and implements, freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital (see Single Market) between Schengen member countries.

Schengen member countries operate harmonised controls at the external borders of the Schengen area. There is also a high level of cooperation between the police forces, customs authorities and external border control authorities of Schengen member countries. The Schengen Information System (SIS) provides for efficient sharing of information between authorities in the various states. Occasionally, in response to specific threats, controls may be temporarily introduced.

Currently 25 of the 27 EU member states are part of Schengen as well as all 4 members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) – Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The most recent countries to join Schengen were Croatia (1 January 2023) and Bulgaria and Romania (air and sea borders only, from 31 March 2024). Ireland is not part of Schengen and Cyprus is not yet participating. Overall, Schengen allows more than 400 million people to travel freely without going through border controls.

Policy considerations

Schengen demonstrates the freedoms of movement in real life. The biggest benefit of Schengen probably accrues to people crossing a land border: there is no need to stop for border controls.

When crossing an air border, Schengen removes the “queueing point” at passport control – though compared with the need to be at the airport well before take-off time, the queues at security and the wait for baggage collection, the passport queue is usually only a minor irritant (similar comments apply for sea crossings or Eurotunnel journeys). However, during peak travel times or holiday seasons, it would be good to eliminate any bottle neck.

The UK only has a land border to the Republic of Ireland, so we would not benefit from easier land border formalities. However, it might be worth joining Schengen to ease travel by air and sea. It would require careful consideration of the impact on migration management and on security.

Considering the open land border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland/UK, a decision to join Schengen would need to be coordinated with the Republic of Ireland, which is not a Schengen member.

Part 5: Environment, Energy, Transport Land, Food and Fisheries

The European Union has increasingly, over recent years, become an advocate for forward-looking policies on climate, environment and natural resource issues. It has played an important role in a series of Climate and Biodiversity COPs, and the size of its market and its role as a leader in the establishment of international norms and standards give it the possibility of being a significant force for good. At the same time, shared decision making at the EU level on these issues has made it easier to take progressive decisions than it would have been at the level of individual states, which might have been concerned at the impact on their competitiveness in trade relations or their party’s electoral chances in their national elections. 

In some areas, the EU has been notoriously susceptible to industry lobbying. The inefficient Common Agricultural Policy, which in the past subsidised over-production and has persistently subsidised large landowners without any regard to the way that they farm or their environmental impact,  is a case in point. Similarly, while it has improved over time, the Common Fisheries Policy has (like the UK’s own approach to fisheries post-Brexit) allowed the short-term economic interest of fishing fleets to water down the more restrictive approach that scientific advice has called for in setting quotas. Lobbying from the fossil fuel industries has also been a persistent problem, though that has been somewhat ameliorated by the emergencies relating to oil and gas supplies as a result of sanctions on Russia. 

Nevertheless as an EU Member State we would be in a position to influence the development of policy across the whole of the EU, and to shape the EU’s international position on these issues, which are central to addressing the twin crises of climate and biodiversity. Effective UK diplomacy within the EU can help create a virtuous circle, with Member States supporting one another in legislating and implementing ambitious progressive policies, and the EU acting as a motor for global action. 

While we remain outside the EU, close co-operation will allow us both to influence the EU debate to some extent, and to be well prepared when we do re-join, if we aim to match or exceed EU standards in these areas and to co-operate to the maximum degree possible.

Part 6: Education, Science, Health and Technology     

Science and engineering research and development is an international endeavour, reliant on the creativity of individual researchers, and, in the case of large-scale projects, transnational economies of scale. For many reasons it makes sense to collaborate, exchange ideas and share knowledge with countries both near and far, and the clearest illustration of this is the European Union’s Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development. 

Leaving aside the benefits to all from sharing knowledge and expertise, the UK was a net beneficiary in monetary terms from the funding schemes under the EU’s Framework Programmes. 

The latest programme is Horizon Europe. This runs from 2021 to 2027, providing funding for academic and industrial researchers in their home countries, and facilitating fellowships that encourage mobility among scholars.

With a current budget of €95.5bn, Horizon Europe is the EU’s key funding programme for research and innovation. Its civil aspect has three pillars: Excellent Science; Global Challenges & European Industrial Competitiveness; and Innovative Europe. A small part of the funding is also allocated to what is called “Widening Participation and Strengthening the European Research Area”.

Besides the civil aspect, there is also a European Defence Fund which is part of Horizon Europe. In addition, the European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom (on which see further below) is also linked with Horizon Europe. As well as nuclear power, Euratom deals with the supply and regulation of radioisotopes used in medicine. Following Brexit, the UK is an associated rather than full member of Euratom.

The Excellent Science pillar includes schemes run by the European Research Council, which awards grants to individual researchers and their teams across European universities and institutes. In addition, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions provide opportunities for young scholars to move to other countries to pursue their research careers. 

Examples of notable Horizon Europe projects tackling contemporary challenges include: 

• Conquering Cancer: saving and extending lives; living longer and better; developing a thorough understanding of cancer; disease prevention; optimising diagnosis and treatment; support the quality of life of those with cancer; and ensuring equitable healthcare access across Europe. 
• A Climate Resilient Europe: preparing for climate disruptions, and accelerating the transformation to a climate-resilient Europe and beyond by 2030.
• Mission Starfish 2030: restoring our Ocean and Waters Targets by 2030; cleaning seas and fresh waters; restoring degraded ecosystems and habitats; and decarbonising the blue economy in order to sustainably harness the valuable resources they provide. 
• 100 Climate-Neutral Cities by 2030: support, promote and showcase 100 European cities in their systemic transformation towards climate neutrality by 2030, and turn these cities into innovation hubs for all cities, benefiting the quality of life and sustainability in Europe. 
• Caring for Soil is Caring for Life: ensuring that by 2030, at least 75% of all soils in the EU are healthy for food, people, nature and climate. The proposed mission combines research and innovation, education and training, investments, and the demonstration of good practices using “Living labs” (experiments and innovation in a laboratory on the ground) and “Lighthouses” (places to showcase good practices).

Association to Horizon Europe is the closest form of cooperation available for non-EU countries. It allows entities of associated countries to participate in programme actions on roughly equal terms with those in EU countries, albeit with no formal voice in programme policymaking. It is covered in Article 16 of the Horizon Europe Regulation. Associated membership is offered not only to EU neighbouring countries, but also to any country in the world with a strong research and innovation capacity that shares common values with the EU.

There are four categories of countries eligible for association with the programme

1. Members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which are members of the European Economic Area (EEA)
2. Acceding countries, candidate countries and potential candidates
3. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries
4. Other third countries  and territories that fulfil a set of criteria related to their economic, political and research and innovation systems

Following Brexit, the UK ceased to be part of the EU’s Framework Programmes, but in January 2024 it negotiated an associated membership that restores some of the benefits previously enjoyed. This means that research institutes and companies located in the UK may participate in project consortia from the 2024 work programme onwards. They will have access to calls for proposals under the entire Horizon Europe Framework Programme with the exception of the European Innovation Council, the European Defence Fund, and secure aspects of the Galileo satellite navigation system. 

UK third-party participation in Euratom is now confined largely to the supply and transfer of nuclear material, radioactive waste management, and the regulation of medical radioisotopes.

The Green Party proposes that we should continue this arrangement, until such time as we can once again participate fully by right, as a member state of the EU. Associated members provide a financial contribution based on an international agreement with the EU. 

As a member of the EU, the UK typically received considerably more in funding from the European research funding schemes than it contributed, aside from the advantages of a non-tangible sort that flow from the free movement of research personnel and their ideas. Brexit has dealt a major blow to Britain’s international standing in science and engineering.

Note that the European Space Agency, which is not part of the EU, is governed by an international treaty to which non-European states such as Canada are signatories. ESA is, however, increasingly linked to the EU via the Copernicus Earth observation and Galileo satellite navigation systems, and some defence-related projects. The UK has always been and remains a full member of ESA, but is locked out of certain parts of its work, and as a result has lost out financially and reputationally in areas in which there is considerable British expertise.

Other European agencies of which the UK by virtue of Brexit is no longer a member include the European Environment Agency, and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Associated membership of both is conceivable given sufficient political will on both sides.

On the question of data security, we have seen threats by the UK state to diverge from the common General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Whether this is political games-playing or something more serious remains to be seen, but we should guard against any weakening of UK GDPR which could risk the UK being digitally quarantined, and not only from Europe.

Finally, we come to education and training. Following Brexit, the UK has still to negotiate with the EU on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, and has declined to participate in the Erasmus+ student exchange scheme, thereby depriving British school students of opportunities to study and experience life in other European countries. The UK’s new Turing scheme is by no means a satisfactory replacement for Erasmus+, and in practice it is failing students from disadvantaged backgrounds, with a convoluted application process and, unlike Erasmus+, no guarantee of funding.

Part 7: External Relations including Foreign and Security Policy

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) grew out of the earlier Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1995 following the fall of the Soviet Union. The CSCE in turn had grown out of the process that concluded with the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which formalised agreement on Europe’s post World War II borders, and made human rights issues in each signatory state a legitimate concern for other Member States. The CSCE became the framework for new approaches to common security in Europe, including the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) of 1990, which limited the levels of conventional armed forces in Europe (including European Russia) and provided for unprecedented levels of intrusive verification.

The OSCE is the world’s largest regional security-oriented intergovernmental organisation with observer status at the United Nations. Its mandate includes issues such as arms control, promotion of human rights, freedom of the press, and free and fair elections. The OSCE has 57 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America (and including the Russian Federation and Ukraine).

Although a return to East-West confrontation in Europe has reduced the effectiveness of the OSCE, it nevertheless remains both an important player on security and human rights issues, and a model for a better way to manage security concerns. 

European Political Community

The European Political Community (EPC) is a bi-annual gathering of leaders representing (now) 45 European countries to provide a platform to discuss strategic issues in Europe. It was proposed by Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, in 2022, in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Presidents of the European Council and the European Union also participate. Membership of the EPC does not replace the UK’s membership of the EU, but it does provide a useful structure for closer coordination across Europe. 

The European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established in 1993 as a result of the Maastricht Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty led to the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), responsible for implementing the CFSP under the guidance of the High Representative, effectively the EU’s Foreign Minister.

The idea behind CFSP is to give the EU a clear diplomatic identity, and a role in international affairs commensurate with its economic weight. 

The CFSP includes the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Common Security and Defence Policy, in turn, includes PESCO, the Permanent Structured Coordination. While these structures are essentially EU activities, non-EU states can cooperate.

Over time, as Member States’ foreign policies have generally become more closely aligned, CFSP and its institutions have become more effective. However, it is always susceptible to differences between Member States, as we have seen recently with Hungary’s more conciliatory approach to Russia and China. When it works well, for example with the EU role in negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, it can make a significant difference. 

Re-joining the EU and thus CFSP will allow the UK to exert an important influence on the future shaping of European external policy, acting as a multiplier for our own policy approaches and making us part of a bigger and more influential bloc. 

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was established in 1991 as a means to support economic reform and development in the former communist countries of eastern and central Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Its support for economic reform was initially very much focussed on the creation of free markets. Its shareholders now comprise 71 countries, the European Union and the European Investment Bank. The access of Russia and Belarus to funding was suspended after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but both countries remain shareholders. The UK was a founder member.  

It has always been part of the EBRD’s mandate to support political – democratic – transformation in the countries to which it provides funding. Over the last few years it has also focussed more on climate mitigation, adaptation and other environmental issues. The EBRD has sometimes been criticised for failing to maintain these principles in practice, and for some alleged failures of due diligence, and it continues to fund some fossil fuel projects on a “highly selective” basis. Nevertheless it has the potential to be a strong force for responsible, sustainable development and democratic reform. 

European Co-operation on International Trade

As one of the world’s biggest trading blocs, the EU can be a powerful  negotiator of trade agreements on behalf of its member states, and can have a significant  influence on the shape of the global trading system. While we are outside the EU there is value in working as closely as we can with the Commission, in particular in international fora such as the WTO, to push for agreements that are socially and environmentally progressive.

Police and crime

Europol and Eurojust are the European organisations that coordinate and support cooperation between national police and judicial authorities. Only EU Member States are members of these organisations, but they have a range of co-operation agreements with other European and non-European countries. The UK is on the list of countries with which information can be shared but does not have any more substantive agreement. This unnecessarily reduces our ability to work effectively with these two organisations, something that is essential, not least given the organised crime networks that exist across Europe. 

Wider Europe

The key point here is that cooperation throughout Europe is essential as we face the climate crisis and issues of social and economic justice. It is therefore important that the future development of European institutions is inclusive and serves these purposes.

EU 780 puts down a marker that we do not want to see a renewed East-West division of Europe. Confrontation between Russia and the West is not inevitable. The present situation is a result of choices made by those in power in Russia. It is not possible to say how or when the war in Ukraine will end.  Until it does, and until Russia‘s government is ready to take a different approach to security and human rights, a significant resumption of co-operation will be difficult or impossible. Nevertheless we should not lose sight of it as a goal, and our approach to dealing with Russia now and once the conflict in Ukraine ends should be driven by a vision of a Europe with common values and common interests. 

Part 8: Citizenship and Freedom of Movement

Citizenship is a concept that goes beyond national identity and allegiance. In 2023, we celebrated the30th anniversary of the introduction of a supranational citizenship that confers rights, protections and opportunities for nationals of EU member states.

The Treaty on the European Union, known commonly as the Maastricht Treaty, marked the transition from the European Economic Community of old to the European Union as we know it today. At the time of the treaty’s adoption in 1993, the EU comprised just 12 member states, and Maastricht set in train a process of European integration that continues to this day with a greatly enlarged union of 27 states (28 until Brexit) and around 450 million people.

European citizenship is an extension of nation-state citizenship that provides among other things for the freedom of settlement and employment across EU/EEA territories. European citizens are free to do business, trade and transport goods, provide services, and move capital across borders in a manner that was previously subject to legal and bureaucratic barriers.

European citizens have as individual persons the legal protections offered by EU law, including but not limited to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, together with various directives that cover personal data, equal pay, and freedom from discrimination in employment. Citizens may also vote and stand as candidates in European Parliament, local and regional elections, petition the European Parliament, complain to the European Ombudsman, and launch and take part in citizens’ initiatives that call on the European Commission to legislate on any issue of interest to them.

The Green Party recognises the many achievements of the EU in consolidating citizens’ rights and protections. Membership of the EU gave UK citizens all the rights and privileges associates with EU citizenship, and, in a reciprocal manner, provided citizens of other member states with rights to live, work, raise families, and access healthcare services in the UK. Brexit necessarily led to the loss of such rights for citizens of the UK, and similarly saw a removal of rights for EU nationals either established already in the UK, or wishing to move here. Re-joining the EU will reinstate these lost rights, and so provide enormous benefits for ordinary people looking to go about their daily lives without hindrance from the state.

While the UK or its constituent countries are outside the EU, the Green Party will support moves to improve the freedom of movement of UK and EU citizens, and wherever possible ameliorate damage due to Brexit. How much scope there is for change is unknown, but the review of the withdrawal agreement in 2026 may provide an opportunity for negotiating a simplified regime for business travel, and better legal protections for UK and EU citizens resident in each others’ territories.

While we regard European citizenship and freedom of movement as very good things, they should be considered in a global rather than ‘Fortress Europe’ context. What we need is a fair and humane system of managed migration that allows people to move if they need or wish to do so.

Part 9: The Council of Europe

This section was approved by Autumn Conference 2023.

The Council of Europe is Europe’s main human rights institution. It was founded in 1949 with a mandate to support democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The UK was a founding member, and remains a member. The UK’s membership of the Council of Europe and its adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights – one of the Council of Europe’s central conventions – has been called into question by the British Government. The Green Party’s policy on Europe should flag up clearly the importance of continued and committed membership.

The Council of Europe is not connected to the EU, though there is a physical bridge between the buildings in Strasbourg. It has 46 member states – stretching from Iceland to Turkey and from Spain to the Caucasus – of whom 27 are members of the EU. Belarus is not a member, and Russia’s membership was revoked by a decision of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Committee of Ministers comprises the foreign ministers of member states. There is a Parliamentary Assembly consisting of members of parliament from the member states.

All member states of the Council of Europe have signed up to the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECHR is designed to enshrine and protect human rights and the principles of democracy and the rule of law among European countries, to ensure that there will be no repetition of the appalling human rights abuses that disfigured mid-20th Century Europe. The Convention is overseen by the European Court of Human Rights, founded in 1959, which has 47 judges (one for each member) elected by the Parliamentary Assembly.

Member states can be sanctioned for breaches of the Convention. It protects us from our own government: cases are almost invariably brought by individuals alleging breach of their rights by the state. If governments see the European Court as an infringement of sovereignty, they are the problem.

The Council of Europe continues to develop and deliver new protocols and agree conventions concerning emerging rights issues, for example on cybercrime, data, and terrorism.

At present the EU is not a member state and this means that violations by the EU itself cannot be challenged directly in the court (though implementation at national level can). The EU is obliged to become a member by the Lisbon Treaty 2009, but accession has not yet been completed. 

Part 10: Preparing the political ground in the UK for re-joining the EU

This section reflects on the issues that led to the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum, and sets out some guidance on building a consensus for re-joining the European Union. 

Re-joining the EU is not a realistic option until we have a stable and significant majority of public opinion in favour, with likewise some level of stable cross-party consensus in parliament. A further referendum would be likely to be divisive in the same way as the 2016 referendum. We therefore favour an approach that aims to build consensus along with a clearer public understanding of the issues at stake.

Consultation

In drafting this policy chapter, we have consulted widely, including with all active Policy Working Groups, relevant Green Party spokespeople, the Young Greens, the party leadership, and the Scottish, Irish, Welsh and European Greens. 

We have had comments on the draft from the Policy Development Committee; the Policy Working Groups on Animal Rights, Asylum and Migration, Countryside, Education, Finance and Economy, Housing, Industry and Jobs, International Development, Land, Transport, and Wildlife and Habitat; the Spokesperson on Global Solidarity; Caroline Lucas, Molly Scott-Cato and Ellie Chowns; and the Young Greens. The final draft reflects those comments.  

The Europe PWG includes representatives from:

The European Movement (Richard Wilson)

Another Europe is Possible (Erwin Schaefer)

The European Green Party (Carlotta Weber, now replaced by Iris Bos).

The Brexit Monitoring Group (EU Liaison Group): Catherine Rowett

Former MEPs: Catherine Rowett

Experienced diplomats: George Edgar

The SNP: Kenneth MacArthur

EU citizens resident in the UK: several members of the group

The Peace Security and Defence PWG: Deolinda Eltringham and George Edgar

The Climate Emergency PWG (economics sub-group): David Giaretta

Policy Development Committee: Vix Lowthion

Europe Policy Working Group 16 July 2024

3. Keep in touch with the Green Party’s Europe Policy Working Group?